If a belligerent becomes a peacekeeper, they are more likely to be targets of those who had been on the opposing side of the conflict. It is obviously the kind of demand that is likely to be rejected by those who are independent minded, let alone those who are suspicious of NATO motives. It is bound to be resisted by those on the other side of the conflict which will naturally see this as an army of occupation. Such a demand was bound to prolong the negotiations, and the failure to reach agreement was used as a convenient reason to intensify the bombing of increasingly civil targets (bridges, oil refineries, and even a TV station).

If NATO believed that the situation justified the waging of war and believed that they should become a belligerent, then they should have seen that taking such action ruled them out of a role in the peacekeeping force. Under such circumstances, the peacekeeping role would fall to others. The suggestion that there were no others who could perform that role is an insult to many countries with a record of peacekeeping second to none -including Australia, New Zealand, India, Finland, Sweden and Fiji. There are plenty of other countries with sufficient experience to serve under the command of a seasoned peacekeeper from one of the above named neutral countries. Under these circumstances, Russian would be a better bet than the belligerents. If NATO troops were to be used, they could at least be from those NATO countries that did not actively participate in the hostilities.

One of the most curious disputes was generated by NATO insistence that the bombing would not stop until the Serb had engaged in significant withdrawals from Kosovo. This is a catch twenty-two of which Joseph Reller would have been proud. If NATO insist that the Serb withdraw but also insist that they will keep bombing for a period after the withdrawal has begun then that logically means that they have the right to bomb the troops after they have left their protected positions and started retreating. The Russian described this as contrary to all military logic and commonsense. In the end, NATO did not insist on it and agreed in advance that they would not bomb the withdrawing troops.

NATO used this as an excuse to take command of K-FOR and control it as they saw fit. NATO gave each of its own members a part of Kosovo to patrol but denied the Russian any area (something which may well have led the Russian to make their move to Pristina airport).

The move by the Russian to rush into Pristina airport was criticized in the West as an act of hostility and the Russian acting on their own. However, from the point of view of the Russian, NATO had been acting on its own without reference to the UNSC for three months. Now that there was a UNSC resolution which clearly included a Russian role, NATO seemed to be trying to cut the Russian out of it by stalling on an agreement on where the Russian would be. It is not as if there had not been enough time to consider this matter. The mixed force had been agreed for more than a month.